International Seminar on 

Vidya Bhawan Society, Udaipur

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Constructing a fundamental premise of constructivism is of the construction of a coherent system of knowledge through an interaction of an individual with an external input. This interaction is, first and foremost, individual and personal, but when enacted within a group of learners, yields a knowledge that is both accommodating and accommodated. As a consequence, a constructivist curriculum is expected to emphasize cooperative decision-making and problem solving, on the assumption that such activities will nurture the development of an autonomous moral reasoning based on fairness and equality.

   In this talk, I would like to examine whether the moral is indeed produced by such interpersonal interaction, in the light of recent research on human and animal minds (the work of Marc Hauser and his colleagues), showing that a substantial part of this ‘moral sense’ may well have a biological basis that is not restricted to our species alone. I will argue that this hypothesis – whereby an instinctive sense of right and wrong, cooperative behaviour, and altruism in general are evolutionarily selected for -- pose new challenges to a constructivist approach to knowledge.

If the construction of an autonomous moral sense is individual, internal, and without reference to the external/social, whither constructivism? Can an individual knowledge ever be constructed in an interpersonal context? Is the goal sought, moral accommodation or moral relativism?

   If as Hauser suggests, the reason why humans have remained quite unheeding of this biological imperative because the ability relates to “judging” rather than ‘doing”, then whither constructivism again? If there is indeed such a slippage between knowledge and action, then a constructed knowledge need not translate into a behaviour that is determined by the principles of that knowledge.

   I will argue that the Hauser et al proposals neither condemn us to a sociobiology view of human nature, nor do they undermine, in essence, the facilitative role of pedagogy in the construction of moral values. Rather, they indicate that constructivism must recognize that a moral judgement is not the result of (increased) interpersonal communication, and that what must be constructed is an individual ability for translation of morality into action.